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MARRIAGE

By ROBERT C. MORTIMER

From the beginning of creation God made them male and female. Marriage is not an artificial human institution. It is a natural necessity. As such it is to be found in every human society. The details of the customs or laws by which it is regulated may vary from age to age and from race to race, yet the institution itself remains recognisable and identical in its broad outline.

Because it is thus a natural necessity, its true nature and the laws which most fittingly govern it are to be sought not in the lowest common denominator of all of the laws and customs which can anywhere be found ever to have existed, but in those conditions which best satisfy that natural necessity in which it is rooted. That necessity is primarily the continuation of the human species, which requires a certain connection of man and woman. For the mere propagating of children, casual and promiscuous unions would be sufficient, but the continuation of the human species demands more than that. If the children are to survive, they need care and protection. If they are to receive the fullness of their human inheritance, they require, further, moral and intellectual education; they must learn to live as humans naturally live, in society; they must learn to give and to receive affection, tolerance, and those mutual services by means of which society is preserved.

In the case of those animals whose offspring require little or no post-natal protection, nature implants only the instinct of sex; where such protection is needed, she adds the instinct of parental affection. This has the effect of perpetuating the close association of male and female during the period of the growth of the offspring; the female attending mostly to the young and the male protecting and supplying the family. The strength of this instinct varies with different animals. It is at its strongest in Man, for here it is reinforced by the fact that while Man gives birth to fresh children whole, those already born are still entirely dependent on their parents; and, as the growth of children to maturity is a slow process with the human race and covers a period of years, it follows that the connection between the parents is indefinitely prolonged and extends even beyond the period of child-bearing. It is a connection

stimulated and maintained in the first instance by the instinct of sex and continued by that of parental affection. From this long connection results a community of interest and a fusion of two lives.

The sexual act in Man differs from that of animals because of Man's endowment of reason. It is not for him a mere instinct but a personal act of choice. In consequence, the physical desire from which it springs is not one for gratification only but includes also an emotion of love and affection towards the other partner. This characteristic of human love is greatly increased and enhanced as a result of the parental instinct. The long continuity and intimate association of the man and the woman produces an habitual affection which survives and supplants the element of physical desire. In the same way, the natural instinct of parental affection surpasses that to be found in animals, partly because it is from the outset rational and not merely instinctive, and partly as a result of the long period of close family intercourse which nature imposes.

In other words, the human species is naturally constituted in families. The human instincts of sex and parenthood being at once physical and emotional receive their fullest satisfaction in the family, and apart from the family suffer frustration; for both instincts include an element of disinterested love and affection which is capable of expression and satisfaction through the long, close and stable intercourse of the family, and in no other way.

Sex and parenthood prescribe also the basic rules and conditions of family life. Human love demands the fullest possible measure of giving and sharing. If it be merely an impulse for self-gratification we withhold from it the dignity of the name of love and call it 'lust', signifying thereby that we recognize that it has fallen from the state of true nature and is not what it professes to be, the love of man and woman. It is a caricature of the matings of the animals. This disinterested quality present in human sexual love presupposes and demands an equality between the lovers, a ready eagerness in mutual respect, honour and affection. It is not fully satisfied with anything less than a total community of life, whereby two individuals grow together into a new unit of society. In this way it provides a strong and valuable corrective to the natural superiority of the man over the woman. This superiority has its roots in the normal conditions of sex and is not abolished in human marriage. It is, however, restrained within the limits imposed by a love which finds satisfaction not in domination but

in giving, and which cannot help but respect the separate individuality with which it strives to identify and fuse itself.

The human sex instinct therefore tends, when true to itself, to create one unit out of two persons, equal to each other in community of life and mutual love and honour, but subordinate, the one to the other, by diversity of function.

The instinct of parenthood, in like manner, tends to the creation of a social unit. This instinct in human beings regards not merely the physical well-being of the offspring, but their mental and moral development as well. This development demands the close attention and the moral influence of both parents, who have each different contributions to make, and the full purpose of parenthood cannot be realised without the creation of a joint life shared by each of the parents on equal terms, into which the children are increasingly admitted as they develop, and of which they are, and come to realize that they are, an integral part. The natural dominion and authority of parents over their children is thus tempered by the same quality of disinterest in the parental instinct as is present in the sex instinct; for this quality demands for its full satisfaction a recognition of the individuality of the children, and works for the final admission of them, on terms of equality, into the unit of the family.

Marriage, then, is this connection of a man and a woman for the purpose of producing and raising children, and issues in the creation of the family. It is clear that not every connection is a marriage. A merely casual and incidental sexual union does not suffice. It is necessary that there be a deliberate intention on both sides, and this is what is meant by saying that consent or contract makes a marriage. The creation of so close a union as marriage, involving the surrender of full control of one's body, and the granting of such extensive rights to another would be intolerable and immoral if it were not mutual and the result of free consent.

This free contract or wedding is more or less recognized in all human societies of whatever stage of development and, further, since the interests of the community are always concerned in matters of sex generally and in particular in the creation of families, which are its component parts, the contract must always have about it some element of publicity. A marriage, then, is created by the contract, but the contract once having been duly made passes into something else, namely, the marriage. Marriage is not itself a contract, but a status, a state of

life. Those who have contracted marriage, even before the contract has been fulfilled by the act of sexual union, and still more afterwards, have entered upon a new condition, the condition of being married. A family, a social unit, has been brought into being, and this new status and new relationship persists throughout the joint lifetime of the two who have brought it into existence. It is not governed by the contract but by the law of its own nature and the supplemental regulations of human jurisprudence. The contract is a mere instrument serving to bring the marriage about.

The marriage thus created is not itself a contractual state and its terms and conditions are not like those of a contract, capable of being revised or rescinded by the mutual agreement of the parties. The two parties are bound to the fulfilment of their mutual duties not by their own consent merely, not by the terms of the contract—though these have created the married state—but by a natural obligation. They stand to one another as husband and wife, with all that involves in the nature of things. The essence of this relationship, its bare existence, no power on earth can remove so long as they both exist on earth. Circumstances, such as imprisonment or lunacy, may make it impossible to fulfill all the duties of the married state; human law may intervene and relieve one or both of the parties from some of their obligations on the score of special hardship; but the relationship itself remains. It is the erroneous view of marriage as a contract merely which lies behind all systems of jurisprudence which claim to dissolve marriages. It is the conviction that marriage is not a contract but a status which lies behind the doctrine of its indissolubility.

The natural indissolubility of marriage and the exclusiveness of the relationship of man and wife have both been denied at different times and in different societies; yet both divorce and polygamy militate against fulfilment of the sexual and parental impulses in Man in the nature of things. As I tried at the outset to show, sex and parenthood find their satisfaction in the enduring and exclusive union of one man with one woman. Any deviation from this is an aberration, and those societies which permit such deviations, for whatever reasons of expediency or compassion, suffer a diminution of their well-being. The birth-rate drops; the instincts either of sex or of parenthood or of both are frustrated in sections of the population, with all of the moral evils which must flow from that. The stability of families, upon which, as the basic constituents out of which it is formed, society itself is established,

is endangered. The moral fibre of youth is weakened. Both polygamy and divorce, being against the natural law, produce inevitably their evil results. The true order of human development is to be found in those societies which recognize that in the nature of things nobody can be husband or wife in more than one family at a time; that a marriage is not simply an agreement to live together terminable at will or by leave of the State, but the creation of a family, a social unit, with a life, status and laws of its own. This natural indissolubility and exclusiveness of marriage is confirmed by the authority of revelation; "For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother and shall cleave unto his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh." The creation by marriage of a new social unit, the family; the closeness of the relationship between husband and wife, their fusion into a joint shared life, the permanence and exclusiveness of the union, are all clearly enough implied in this pregnant saying. This recognition of the natural law vouchsafed to the Jewish people was confirmed by Our Lord Himself, Who, in the one particular of the permanence of the union, supplemented it by an explicit statement: "Whosoever putteth away his wife and marieth another committeth adultery, and whosoever marieth her who is put away from her husband committeth adultery." A marriage after divorce is not a marriage but adultery. The clarity and finality of this saying is marred by the attribution to Our Lord by Saint Matthew of an exception. According to this form of the saying, Our Lord taught that marriage after divorce is not marriage but adultery unless the divorce was on the ground of adultery. On this it should be said first that for six hundred years the Church never adduced this passage as a justification of marriage after divorce; it was taken to allow for separation only. Secondly, for four hundred years, in a world where marriage after divorce was common, as common as it is to-day, the Church absolutely and without exception forbade it. This can only be explained by the assumption that She understood Our Lord's teaching on this subject as Saint Paul understood it: "Unto the married I command, yet not I but the Lord, let not a wife depart from her husband, but and if she depart let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband, and let not the husband put away his wife." Surely it is difficult to find any principle by which adultery should be accorded this power of dissolving marriage whilst other violations of the duties of marriage should not. Persistent cruelty or desertion are just as flagrant violations as adultery, and

indeed are often more deliberate and selfish. It would be reasonable therefore to suppose that they could destroy the marriage bond more effectively and more decisively than adultery. To hold that adultery is the only ground for divorce is to exalt and emphasize the physical element in marriage over all else. It is very unlikely that Our Lord would have done this.

By a natural law, then, confirmed by Divine revelation, marriage is a lifelong and exclusive union of one man with one woman for the producing and rearing of children. It is effected by the contract. For the contract to be valid, that is to set up the marriage, certain minimum conditions are necessary. The absence of any one of those conditions invalidates the contract, with the result that what has before been regarded as a marriage has now to be regarded as having never been a marriage at all.

First, the two parties to the contract must be physically capable of marriage. The marriage contract involves the mutual surrender of rights over the body, the conveyance of a right to the act of sexual union. Such a contract can obviously not be made by one who is not in possession of the physical powers by which alone it can be implemented. Children below the age of puberty and adults who are impotent cannot therefore marry.

Secondly, the consent of both parties to the contract must be free and full. If the contract, therefore, is induced by fear or compulsion it is invalid. A difficult problem is raised by the question how far deceit and error invalidate a marriage contract. Where the consent is only obtained by such means, it can hardly be said to be full and free. On the other hand, the full facts about the character of another human being can never be known with certainty, and many a man consents to marry a woman thinking her to be other than she really is, and if he had known what he later discovers it is likely enough that he never would have married her at all. But where should we draw the line? This is one of those cases where a general principle dictated by the natural law has to be applied in detail by the provisions of the human law. The law of the Church of Western Europe has held that only two kinds of error invalidate a marriage. The first springs from a bye-gone social organization and is now obsolete: if one of the contracting parties is thought to be free-born but is in fact a slave, the marriage is invalid. The other is mistaken identity—a mistake which occurs rarely if ever now, but which was not so uncommon in days when transport and

communications were difficult and where it was the custom for women to marry heavily veiled. "If a bridegroom or bride intending to contract with one person by fraud or accident exchanges vows with another the contract is void." The law of England has recently added instances of conscious deceit: if one of the parties conceals from the other the fact that they are suffering from certain forms of venereal disease or mental infirmity, or if the bride conceals the fact of her pregnancy by another man, the contract may be made void. If these provisions are contrary to Church Law, it does not appear certain that they are contrary to the natural law; but this is not a time for full discussion of a difficult and somewhat technical point.

Another condition for the validity of a marriage contract is that the parties must not be closely akin to one another. Marriage creates a new family and the institution of marriage and its laws serve to protect the stability of the family. Now sexual unions between members of the same family and especially of those members who live under a common roof have the most disturbing effect upon the peace and harmony of the family. Nature seems accordingly to have implanted in man a deep instinctive revulsion from such unions. The horror of incest is to be found in every society from the most primitive to the most sophisticated. It is most apparent in the case of close natural relationships of blood. It operates also however in the case of the semi-natural relationships between a man and his wife's blood relatives. The instinctive horror of a marriage between a father and a daughter is paralleled by an equal horror of a marriage between a man and his deceased wife's mother. Here again, however, natural law provides the general principle; its detailed application is the work of human law, which prudently varies its regulations in accordance with the age and race with which it has to deal. The laws of England and of the Church of England were until recently in agreement that the natural law in this matter was to be applied by making the relationships set out in Leviticus the basis upon which to found its regulations. Leviticus is still the basis, but the law of England withdrew some of the prohibitions, e.g. marriage with deceased wife's sister, and the Church of England has followed suit.

A fourth condition is that neither of the parties is already married. That follows from the unity and indissolubility of marriage. It is not, of course, a condition recognized as necessary in those societies which practice polygamy. But it is recognized in all communities which up-

hold monogamy, even though divorce is allowed with the right of re-marriage. For even then it is the law that no man can have two lawful wives at the same time. Although the law may claim the power to make a wife cease to be a wife and a husband to be a husband, yet until the law has exercised this alleged power, a married man or a married woman who goes through a form of marriage with another person is guilty of the felony of bigamy and this second contract is absolutely void. The law of the Church, recognizing no right of re-marriage after divorce, maintains the law of nature in the sense in which I have already tried to describe it, and holds this condition, of freedom from the bond of existing marriage, to be an essential condition for any marriage contract which it can recognize as fully Christian.

Lastly, it is necessary that both parties to the contract should intend marriage and not something else. Thus, a lunatic is unable to contract marriage because he is unable to understand what he is doing or to intend it seriously. A stage marriage is invalid because, although all the forms and conditions have been observed, neither party intends to marry the other. In the same way, a mutual contract recognizing and discharging some, only, of the essential duties of marriage to the exclusion of others, will not establish a marriage; for the exclusion of others, will not establish a marriage; for the exclusion of some of the duties means that it is not marriage which the parties intend. For example, if they mutually agree that their union shall be terminable at the request of either party, it is not marriage but concubinage into which they are entering. The man is taking a mistress; the woman is taking a lover. Or again, if they agree in no circumstances to have children, or never to live together in any community of life, the contract is no marriage contract. But this condition, that the parties intend a genuine marriage, needs very careful interpretation, or else we shall find nearly every marriage rendered insecure. The true nature of marriage is a matter of the natural law. It is this because it tends to the promotion of man's true happiness and well-being, that is, it corresponds to and seeks to satisfy his true nature. In consequence, it may reasonably be presumed that every man and woman who contract marriage intend true marriage; nor is this presumption endangered by the fact that in a given community there may be a widespread and prevalent misconception of the true nature of marriage. Even though the parties believe that it is consistent with true marriage for the man to have several wives, or that a marriage may be ended

for certain causes and a new one formed, it does not necessarily follow that when they marry each other they intend either of these things to apply in their own case. It is not an error about the nature of marriage in general which invalidates the marriage contract, but a defective intention about this marriage in particular. Indeed, it is highly likely that when, in a polygamous society, a young man in love takes his first wife, he does intend to cleave only unto her as long as they both shall live; and therefore it is even more likely that such is the case in a society which, despite its divorce laws, claims to be monogamous.

It is these considerations which underlie the legal doctrine that when two persons publicly exchange their marriage vows they must be presumed to intend a genuine marriage. Similar considerations underlie the doctrine in the Canon Law that the marriages of pagans are good marriages, every whit as binding as Christian marriages. It is worth while considering this point a little further because it is sometimes suggested that a Christian marriage, or marriage in Church, has a quality of indissolubility attaching to it which is not present in pagan or register-office marriages. This is a total misconception of the teaching of the Canon Law. In order to prevent disingenuous litigation and to safeguard morals, there is a general and natural presumption that people mean what they say. It has been a maxim of the Canon Law and of the Law of England that this presumption can only be rebutted by the most precise and explicit evidence to the contrary. The law holds that when a man says publicly to a woman, "I take thee to wife" he must be taken to mean what he says, and what he says includes the whole concept of marriage. Neither he nor anyone else can come forward later and say that something else was meant, unless they can produce written or oral evidence establishing with absolute certainty that such was the case. The fact, for example, that in the Church Marriage Service the intention of lifelong union is explicit, whereas in a register-office marriage it is not, makes no difference at all, either in Canon or in English law, for the word "wife" means partner in a life-long union; and, therefore, if a man says "I take thee to wife", that is what he must be presumed to mean. In Christian countries where the Christian doctrine of the natural law of marriage was universally known and accepted, it was natural and convenient to treat this presumption as absolute and irrefutable. Once proved that the marriage vows were duly exchanged, the marriage, short of other grounds of nullity, was established. In dealing with pagan marriages

there was the same presumption but it was less certain, a greater likelihood of defective intention was permitted and the matter was open to argument.

It is quiet clear that a situation has been reached in England and America and in most European countries where this presumption no longer has its old certainty. Divorce is widely recognized as a means of escape from a marriage which turns out badly, and although the grounds of divorce are precisely laid down by the law and great care is taken to detect and punish collusion, it cannot be denied that in practice divorces are frequently sought and obtained by mutual consent. The quality of marriage as indissoluble receives increasingly less recognition, and because of wide-spread misconception and ignorance a considerable part of the population is doubtless genuinely ignorant of this truth about marriage. It does not necessarily follow that no marriages except Church marriages are valid, but it does follow that many of them, and of Church marriages too, may be invalid. The stage has very nearly been reached when the old presumption that every couple who exchange their marriage vows intend a genuine marriage is yielding to the presumption that many of them do not. If this is the true situation it would be right for the Church to do two things. First, there would be a clear and pressing duty for her to proclaim afresh the duties and obligations of marriage, and to take whatever steps are necessary to see that all those who marry in Church are sufficiently aware of what they are doing, so that at least as far as her own members are concerned the old presumption might resume its sway. An end must be put to the scandal of persons publicly promising in the sight of God a lifelong union with the secret intention of ending that union at any time if it proves too onerous. Secondly, it would be right, in the case of previous marriages, whether in Church or not, and in the case of all future civil marriages, to let the presumption that a genuine marriage was intended be more easily rebutted. But this is more simply said than done. It involves the establishment of an Ecclesiastical Court or Courts composed of persons who have knowledge of marriage laws and also skill in the sifting of evidence. It involves also the great difficulty of determining what kind of evidence would be allowed. The kind of case which would come before such a Court would be that of men and women whose early marriages was dissolved and who in later life, being now active members of the Church, desired to marry again: or, being so married, desired to become communicants.

It seems to me it would be very difficult to arrive at certainty over the question of whether the earlier marriage was a genuine marriage or not; but in the absence of direct evidence of an explicit invalidating condition account might be taken of the education and environment of the parties and the conditions under which the marriage took place and the statements on oath of the parties and their friends. In such a way the Court might be able to arrive, if not at certainty, at least at a reasonable presumption that a genuine marriage was or was not intended, and pronounce accordingly. The judgment, of course, would have ecclesiastical value only. It would have no kind of legal effect. If there were such a Court it should also have power to scrutinize all the circumstances of such divorced marriages as were brought before it and to examine the question whether, instead of a decree of divorce, there ought not to have been a declaration of nullity on some ground or other. But this is to raise the whole question of nullity and impediment.

I have already mentioned the main grounds of nullity. They are impotence, consanguinity, being under age, the bond of an existing marriage, defective consent, and clandestinity. Clandestinity means the failure to observe those requirements which the law lays down as being necessary to be observed before marriage, in order to secure due publicity. Defective consent means a consent which is obtained by fear or force, and which is, therefore, not free; or a consent vitiated by error. Error either as to the identity of the other party to the contract, or as to the essential meaning of marriage.

It cannot be too often stated that a ground of nullity is some circumstance, existing at the moment of the marriage contract, on account of which the two contracting parties did not or could not contract a valid marriage. A circumstance which only arises after the marriage contract can never be a ground of nullity. An error as to the essential meaning of marriage may be held to vitiate the contract and make the marriage null only if the error was the cause of the contract: i.e. only if it had been the case that had the truth been known the party in error would not have consented to the contract, and if its existence can be clearly proved. In practice this means that it must be clearly shown that the consent was only a conditional consent, a consent on condition that this or that is the case, or shall or shall not happen. For example, the marriage would be null if it could be clearly shown that the bride's consent was "on condition that I never have a child". It is clear that

any court asked to pronounce a decree of nullity on the ground of defective consent is faced with an extremely difficult and delicate question. On the whole, the existing practice of courts is perhaps the best—to presume that in every case consent was free, full and valid, and to demand the most stringent proof of the contrary. Yet, beyond doubt, this results in declaring some marriages valid which were in fact void, because one or both the parties, in fact and deliberately, never intended to contract marriage in the proper and legal sense of the word.

The Western Church has for centuries admitted two exceptions to the principle of the indissolubility of marriage. The first is, that an unconsummated marriage may be dissolved and the parties set free to re-marry. That a marriage is unconsummated is often, perhaps more usually, because of the physical impotence of one of the parties. And the marriage is ended by a decree of nullity on that ground. But physical impotence is sometimes difficult and always unpleasant to prove, and so sometimes people in this condition are advised to rely simply on the fact that the marriage has remained unconsummated. And sometimes the non-consummation is not due to impotence, but to lack of opportunity or to the refusal of one of the parties. In any case, the Church recognizes that although it is consent which makes the marriage, yet an unconsummated marriage is not a marriage in the full sense of the word. It therefore permits such marriages to be dissolved and sets the parties free to marry again. The other exception is the so-called Pauline Privilege. This is a difficult and complicated matter, and I do not propose to say much about it. I mention it because it is of some importance to those provinces of the Church which live in a pagan environment. The Pauline Privilege permits a convert to marry a Christian after baptism, if the previous heathen husband or wife remains a heathen and refuses to go on living peaceably with the converted Christian partner. It is based on 1 Cor. 7:12-15 "But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God has called us to peace." The effect of the Pauline Privilege is to make it easier for a married pagan to accept baptism; its purpose is to safe-guard the faith of the newly-converted partner to a marriage against the continuous attacks upon it of the unbaptized partner. It is to be noted that the privilege only applies to marriages contracted by two unbaptized persons and after the baptism of one of them. If either was baptised at the time of the

marriage or if both of them are subsequently baptised, the privilege does not apply.

It may be noticed that, apart from a short reference to revelation and a word or two about marriage in Church, I have said nothing about specifically Christian marriage. This has been deliberate. Marriage is a natural institution. The laws of marriage are a part of the law of nature. It is the same for all men. There is not one law for Christians and another law for pagans. It is the same law, though Christians perceive it more clearly, but Christians and pagans alike are subject to it in the order of mere nature, to which marriage as an institution belongs. Christian marriage has, none the less, to be sharply distinguished from pagan marriage in virtue of its sacramental quality. Christian marriage is pagan marriage raised to a supernatural potency. It has received an added endowment. But because it is not, like other sacraments, a specific Christian ordinance, but belongs to the natural order, its sacramental character is not always understood. It does not easily fit into the ordinary scheme of the sacraments, each with its own form and matter. It is simpler to ignore the rather unnecessary question of what precisely is the matter in this sacrament and what the form; it is enough to say that the mutual surrender of the man and woman and the mutual acceptance of that surrender constitute the sacrament. Thus, the contract which sets up the marriage at the same time makes the sacrament. Contract and sacrament are inseparable, so that there is no marriage between Christians which is not sacramental. Though it is desirable, and the rule of the Church, that the contract should be accompanied by specific religious observances, these are not essential. The Church prescribes that the vows shall be exchanged before God in the presence of the congregation, and that the priest shall proclaim the fact of the marriage and pronounce the blessing; but none of this creates the sacrament, which consists of the mutual exchange of the vows alone. The two parties to the contract are thus themselves the ministers of the sacrament. A sacrament is an effectual sign and means of grace, and the practice of Christian religion saves from sin; for to those who believe is vouchsafed a special grace to free them from the tyranny of environment and from the slavery of sin. Entry to this sphere of grace is by baptism, and to the baptised is given both grace for the ordinary circumstances of life and, through the other sacraments, the special renewal or endowment of grace for particular occasions or for the fulfilment of special vocations.

Marriage differs from other sacraments in that the recipients of the grace are also its ministers. The grace of the sacrament of marriage is bestowed on all baptised persons who marry, in virtue of their baptism; being in the sphere of grace they receive the grace of marriage inseparably from the contract. Their marriage is raised thereby out of the order of mere nature into that of supernatural efficiency. Marriage is likened by Saint Paul to the union of Christ with His Church; the superiority of husband to wife is as the headship of Christ over the Church. The husbands are to love their wives as Christ loves the Church, to cherish their wives and care for them as Christ does the Church; husband and wife are to be one flesh, as the Church is the body of Christ. This is the mystery, the sacrament, the sign of marriage.

No words could more finely express the solemnity and sanctity of marriage; the natural union of man and wife has its prototype and analogy in the spiritual union of Christ and the Church, and no less. Marriage in the merely natural order tends towards such a close union and to such self-giving love, but how many obstacles and difficulties thwart it, arising from the lust, and the selfishness of man! That which man is intended by nature to be, but cannot be by reason of sin, is made possible in the realm of grace to those to whom He has given power to become the Sons of God. This, then, is the grace of the sacrament of marriage, not merely, if indeed at all, a remedy against the sin of fornication, for to the pagan marriage is that in some sort, but a sublimation and ennoblement of the sexual instinct into the positive virtue of married chastity. This virtue is the true use of sex for the creation of a family and the expression and enrichment of human love. It issues in those qualities of sacrificial devotion, loyalty, patience, hope and trust which have their type, their model and their full embodiment in the union of Christ and His Church.

It is the nature of man to seek union with his fellow human beings on the mental and spiritual plane; he desires the exchange of ideas and thoughts, and the sharing of experiences; he craves for a mutual sympathy, understanding and support. In a word, his nature demands that close and immediate society and intercourse which we term "the Communion of Saints" and which can only obtain in the presence of and through the power of God, the author of our being. The full attainment of such a society or communion is not possible to men while they are still a compound of flesh and spirit, for the flesh is, in

general, a barrier to such close intercourse; yet nature provides in sex the starting point and instinct for the creation of one such union. If no advance ever be made from its fleshly beginning, the union which results is frustrated and turns to disunity. But sex rightly used transcends itself through the virtue of married chastity exercised in the lifelong union of a man and a woman; it turns, therefore, to just that communion of spirit and inter-diffusion of lives which man's nature demands. Yet, between man's true desire and happiness and its attainment how many obstacles are placed by the weakening disharmony and corruption of human nature. It is the grace of Christian marriage which enables him to overcome these obstacles and to acquire that which by nature he cannot have, yet which nature herself dictates to be his true end and goal.

A THEOLOGY OF THE DIVINE COMMISSION

By PHILIP H. WHITEHEAD

The approach to an understanding of missions presupposes some ground rules inclusive of the following:

- I. A definition of theology
- II. An idea of a doctrine of the Church
- III. An awareness of the content of the divine commission

In so far as a theology of missions demands that these three areas be taken into consideration, and that Roman numeral three is a culmination of the subjects preceeding it, then one justly entitles this paper *A Theology of the Divine Commission*. For, indeed, is it not true that a theology of missions is basically an attempt, first, to know the mission; second, to understand the nature of missions; and, third, to interpret the meaning of the missionary? All of these elements have as their touchstone some view of Christ's commission to his disciples:

"Go ye therefore, and teach all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father,
and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. . . ."

Can we not properly say, then, that at its very core a theology of missions is a theology of the divine commission of our Lord and

Saviour Jesus Christ? One would think so. So, first, a glance at a definition of the term theology.

I.

Christian theology is an attempt to state clearly and logically the Christian doctrines concerning God, so that such doctrines may be understood in such a way as to make Christianity presentable to the modern world; convincing to the rational mind; and personally applicable to Christian living. This does not mean that Christianity is made reasonable by theology. Indeed, Christianity—unknown today in its real vigor, vitality, and essence by those untouched by God's revelation—is, by human standards, unreasonable. It is so, because at its basic content level Christianity presents justice and law as commutated by love and mercy through the very act of the Incarnation. (Commutated is a word meaning basically, "to reverse the direction of". Used in this context, it is a new way of expressing the idea that law and justice are not done away with, but that love and mercy alter or change the legalistic direction which human standards seem always to emphasize.) It seems unreasonable that a just, righteous God would himself come to earth in the Godman, Jesus Christ, to bridge the abyss of separation between Himself and sinful man. The only possible answer to the persistent 'why' of His Incarnation, is the perpetual 'love' of His nature. A sound theology does not attempt to make God's acts reasonable. Rather, a sound theology helps men to become aware of and understand God's gifts to, and will for, creation.

Theology relies upon: (1) Biblical and historical data. It is in scripture and history that we see God in action. (2) A systemization of that data for the Church's benefit and for the relating of the Christian faith to secular alternatives. As distinct from Biblical and historical theology, one might call this systemization of the data dogmatic and apologetic theology. It is in this type of theology that we try to understand the "good news". (3) An application of our knowledge of God to all situations presented by the world. This is pastoral theology. It is responsible for showing that faith in Christ really works.

If theology encompasses all of this, then *A Theology of the Divine Commission* likewise demands that, first, we investigate the Biblical and historical data; secondly, we systematize our conclusions; and thirdly, we pastorally apply what we have learned from the data to the problems raised by the twentieth century's confrontation with Christians under a divine commission.

1. *The Biblical and historical data*

It is not surprising that Frank E. Wilson should entitle his sketch of Church history, *The Divine Commission*. By the association of the descriptive name for Christ's words in Matthew (Chapter 28, verse 19) with an account of the history of the times and the men influenced by those words, Wilson implies that the history of the Church is the story of man's response to our Lord's commission. And so it is. But it is more. Church history is the record of man's response to Christ.

Exegetically this passage of scripture (Mt. 28:19) is referred to as the great or divine Commission. The use of the Trinitarian formula is a later addition representing a fulfillment of understanding. The importance of the commission is not destroyed by this addition. The idea still demands response. The divine commission is the "marching order" for every Christian; "Go therefore . . . teach . . . baptize."

Historically, the charge is authentic. Psychologically, the command is combined with the Christian desire to share in joy and gratitude the gift that is certainly ours by what Christ has freely done. This desire to share, as well as Christ's commission to "go", speaks boldly the true reasons for missionary enterprise.

2. *The data systematized*

The words "Go ye therefore" represent, in themselves, mission. But at this point we cannot proceed without referring to the statement made above. A theology of missions is basically an attempt to:

1. Know the mission
2. Understand the nature of missions
3. Interpret the meaning of missionary

The touchstone of these elements is the divine commission. To systematize data leading to a theology of the divine commission, we must look at the data which comprise the bedrock of the whole Christian faith—the Incarnation. It is in the Incarnation that we see the ground work for a doctrine of the Church, and, eventually, an awareness of the content of the divine commission.

It was stated at Chalcedon, 451 A.D., that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures, divine and human, unseparated and unconfused. Obviously, then, Jesus Christ bridges the gap between man and God; humanity and divinity are reconciled in Christ. Man is able through Christ to traverse the abyss of his own separation from God. Now was this reconciliation meaningful to but a single period in history? No. Is

it meaningful to men today? Yes. The Church exists to make God's reconciliation in the Incarnation significant for all of us today.

II.

A doctrine of the Church is basic to an approach to a mission theology. One description of the Church is that it is 'the Body of Christ'. Whereas Christ is the manifestation of God in the world, the Church is the manifestation of Christ in the world. This means that the Church is 'the Body of Christ' unlimited by space and time. Unlike Jesus of Nazareth, the Church takes 'the Body of Christ' throughout the world. Look closely at the parallel of Christ and the Church as suggested by the data of the Council of Chalcedon:

BY THE INCARNATION:

- a. God became relevant to man through the human Jesus.
- b. God became true humanity.
- c. God became limited by human experience.
- d. God still became nothing less than God.

BY ESTABLISHING THE CHURCH:

- a. Christ becomes relevant through other human beings. "Where two or three are gathered together. . . ."
- b. Christ becomes alive through true human society.
- c. Christ is subject to limitations of humanity.
- d. Christ is none the less Christ.

This picture of the Church as a manifestation of Christ leaves one important question to be answered: How are persons involved in the life of the Church?

Among other things, the Church is a true human society. If this is so, then an analysis of the composition of a society is helpful. A society has the following elements:

Members—those who compose it

Initiation Rites—how one becomes a member

Constitution—the purpose of existence

Common Action—the means of doing the job

Elected representatives—those members set apart to be a constant reminder to the whole of the involvement which each member must have in the purpose

Since these are the parts of all known societies, and the Church is a true human society, then all baptized persons are members of the Christian society. As distinct from all other societies, however, the

constitution is Jesus Christ. The purpose of Christian life is Jesus Christ. In Him is life made full. The common action of the Church society is to be found in the Holy Communion. Elected representation, obviously, is in the hands of bishops, priests, and deacons. The point that needs remain in the foreground is that all baptized persons are the Church: laity as well as clergy. It is not the responsibility of the priesthood to do all of the work, nor of the laity to usurp the representative responsibilities of those whom they and God have called apart to remind the whole society of its calling to be ministers of the Gospel. The Gospel of Jesus Christ is that God loved all of us so much that He gave His Son to be sacrificed on the Cross, so that we might be reconciled with Him.

Considering, then, the doctrine of the Church, one can make some vital discoveries. In the first place, God works through the finite to reveal Himself. The most complete revelation of God for mankind came in the humanity of our Lord. It is the nature of the Church, then, to act as a medium for God. This is why Anglicans can speak boldly about the nature of the Church as being sacramental. The Church uses outward and visible signs to point to God's inward and spiritual Grace or favor towards us.

Obviously, then, the Church sets apart bread and wine, oil for unction, and the ring at marriage as outward signs reminding all of us of the inward presence of God in Holy Communion, the healing processes, and Holy Matrimony.

Bishops, priests, and deacons (and these as missionaries) are sacraments. That is, they have been set apart to remind all baptized persons of the favor and responsibility which God has given them. The ministry, like the Church, has a sacramental nature which points to the society's responsibility to be ministers of reconciliation.

III.

The content of the divine commission, then, is to be found in a doctrine of the Church, and, ultimately, in the meaning of the Incarnation. Baptism and teaching are the means whereby men come to see through a glass dimly. In the first place, baptism puts a man in a relationship with God that allows him to know that he is forgiven, loved, and accepted. Such a relationship is neither merited nor earned. Consequently, it is a part of the work of a Christian missionary to live in such a way that those around him can experience this forgiveness

and love. In the experience, others will be brought to Christ. The teaching aspect of the divine commission is to help men come to know more and more of the nature of God and His will for creation. Teaching and baptism are closely related. Our Lord's commission has teaching first. It is not one of the problems of this paper to deal with the relation of faith and reason. Suffice it to say that the spoken word and the language of relationships are two vital aspects of bringing men to Christ. One must admit that in the "new birth" of baptism, God is able to reveal to those in the Church that which cannot be known outside of the Church. This is not Gnosticism, but rather a definite statement that it is in the Church that one comes to know the experience of God's love.

The mission of all men-in-Christ is to make Christ's love known. Missions are those areas in the world to which men have taken the love of Christ. This means that a theology of missions must avoid the administrative jargon used by missionary organizations. Though this language has its place, it tends to strangle the approach to missions that puts the responsibility on every Christian shoulder.

If the Church is fundamentally mission, we are faced with a dilemma. What are those aggressive few, called missionaries, doing running the whole show? Roland Allen, author of *The Spontaneous Expansion of the Church*, has put his finger clearly upon the disastrous nature of present-day missionary methods. Unfortunately, because the Church is truly human, and limited to the confines of human experience, correction of centuries of misunderstanding is slow, and subject to constant human blundering. Human kind has left the missionary—the elected representative in the Church society who is set apart to be a sacrament of every Christian's responsibility—the entire task of evangelism and conversion. The great mistake, it seems, has been made at that point where a theology of the divine commission has failed to take more fully into consideration the third characteristic of a sound theology.

3. *The pastoral application of what we have learned from the data to the problems raised by the 20th century's confrontation with Christians under a divine commission.*

First a review of the data:

- a. God has given to man Jesus Christ to bridge the broken relationship between God and man.

- b. The Church is the manifestation of the reconciliation in the world today.
- c. Baptized persons are the Church.
- d. For the baptized there is a divine commission to be missionaries to the unregenerate and sinful souls.

The common ground on which all men stand is that "all have sinned and come short of the glory of God." The divine commission presupposes that through preaching from the heart one's experience of Christ crucified, baptism and nurture will follow. The consequences of human sin and laziness have left the missionary enterprise in the hands of the few whom the Church society recognizes as the ones set apart. Too often the elected representatives are seen as the Church. The error is that the sacrament of the ministry has lost its "pointing" nature. Missionaries exist to call attention to the fact that the Church means mission. By and large, however, missionaries have been left with the burden of preaching and living the ministry of reconciliation by themselves.

If the data are correct, the Church, you and I, is not fulfilling the charge laid upon her by Christ. We are Christians under a divine commission who seem to have nothing to say. Of course, there are problems raised when a Christian under a commission confronts an unregenerate. The problems are the same with which early disciples had to deal: politics, cultural barriers, nationalism, ignorance, distrust, *et cetera*. As men come to realize that all have sinned, and that Christ forgives that sin, these problems dwindle away. The key to a mission theology is that all Christians have the charge to live pastorally their "new birth".

To spell this out specifically, living pastorally means that Christ's redemption of the world in love can only be known by an out going love of each Christian for every person with whom he comes in contact: savage, Hindu, Negro, prostitute, mongoloid, or what have you. The ministry of reconciliation must be lived by Christians everywhere. This is what we mean by mission. The marching orders may be the divine commission, but Christians are not to march into each life with the intention of establishing their culture, their ideas, their background. How do men talk of life and reconciliation? Only in the language of relationships. It is easier to see where the ministry of reconciliation is not! Our own backyards display the garbage cans of unacceptance, rejection, and prejudice.

The divine commission gives us a command with content. The content of the divine commission is that "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should have everlasting life." The way this content is brought to fruition in each life, through the mission of the Church by every member of the Church, is for each baptized person to live the Christ-life, a life of love.

A theology of missions, then, is a theology whose roots grow in the soil of pastoral living, not building schools, not westernizing, not selling a culture; but giving a life to persons who have not known the gift of love and reconciliation.

THE THOMISTIC CONCEPTION OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

By RICHARD I. ZUMBRUNNEN

For some two thousand five hundred years, the metaphysical problem of essence and existence has dominated philosophic thought. It has been said by some schools that this problem was only one of semantics, and was, therefore, not worth discussion. On the other hand, it has been the fundamental point upon which other schools base their entire thought. But regardless of whether the problem has been faced as a real problem or not, it underlies all philosophic thought, since it is a problem of what is the ultimate reality. This is the point which St. Thomas realized and upon which he based his entire ontology. In fact one of the Angelic Doctor's earliest works, *De Ente et Essentia*,¹ was written as a straight exposition of his position on this problem, and from this position St. Thomas never departed.

With the advent of modern existentialism, many Thomists began to interpret St. Thomas as being much more existential than he had previously been thought to be. This was done in an attempt to counteract phenomenological existentialism, which posits consciousness

¹I. T. Eschmann in "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works," in E. Gilson's *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, p. 411, states; "To Tolomeo of Lucca we owe the indication that this work was written before the author was made a Master of Theology. The latest date is therefore March 1256." cf. Armand Maurer, in "Translator's Introduction" to *On Being and Essence*, p. 7.

as both the source and the elements of knowledge, by Thomistic empirical existentialism (in philosophical methodology), which posits the extral world as the source of knowledge received by man through his senses. One such Thomist is Etienne Gilson, whose books, *Being and Some Philosophers* and *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, have been the main sources for the existentialist interpretation of St. Thomas's philosophy. But before we look at this view, let us define a few basic but confusing terms.

The first term which we will consider is "substance". St. Thomas contends that as substance is a complete ontological unit which stands by itself and which cannot be divided, all our knowledge of substance is based upon sense experience. Thus we may say that a substance is a complete ontological unit capable of being perceived by the senses. We must remember that St. Thomas, following Aristotle, was a teleological empiricist, *i.e.*, he looked at every substance in terms of its end, or final purpose. We see then that the substance of a rabbit has the purpose or end of being a rabbit, and anything which divides the substance makes it impossible for the substance of the rabbit to fulfill its purpose.

Now substance, in so far as it can be conceived and defined, is called "essence", while the expressed definition of the substance is called the "quiddity" or "whatness", since it tells what the substance is. For example, you look out of the window on a beautiful spring afternoon and see a rabbit on the lawn. The rabbit is a substance whose purpose, or end, is to be a rabbit. This particular substance has the essence "rabbitness" in itself, and when you have perceived the rabbit, the essence is also in your mind as the concept of what a rabbit is. Thus the essence is in the substance (*essentia in re*) and in your mind as the concept of the substance (*essentia post rem*)². But if someone were to ask, "what is it?", the answer, "a rabbit", is the expressed definition of the substance, which is called the quiddity.

Since the only knowledge we have of substance is based upon sense experience of particular substances, we may ask what it is in a rabbit which makes it possible for us to have a concept of it and to place it in the species rabbit. This quality in the substance is called the "form", while the quality in the substance which enables us to distinguish one member of the species from another is called "matter". Thus it is

²Essence also exists as a concept in the mind of God (*essentia ante rem in mente Dei*).

form which gives matter specific determination. Matter apart from that of which it is a part does not exist as a being. Thus we see that a sensible substance is a composit of form and matter.³ Therefore, matter cannot be said to be that by which the substance is.

It will be noticed that so far we have defined "substance", "essence", "quiddity", "form" and "matter", but the term "existence" has not been defined. The reason for this is very simple. St. Thomas tells us that "esse", "existence", or "act-of-being" is not an essence and, therefore, it cannot be the object of a concept or be defined. This can be proved very easily by considering the fact that the concept of a one hundred dollar bill may exist in my mind. I may even conceive of this money as belonging to me. But no matter how hard I think of this money it does not pay the bills, for it exists as a concept and not as a substance. Yet even though we cannot define existence we know that substances exist, since they are the objects of sense experience. That is, we know that the rabbit exists because we see it. Therefore we must conclude that to say a substance exists is to form a judgement that the substance is one, *having the act-of-being*.

Existence is that which determines essence in the sense that it is act which gives the essence being; but the act-of-being may, in another sense, be said to be determined by essence, as potentiality, to be the existence of a certain essence. We must take care not to imagine that neither one or both of these two principles exists previous to their union in a given substance. They are not physical things like chemicals which are compounded by God, but they are two constitutive principles concreated as principles of a particular being. There is no essence without existence and there is no existence without essence, for they are created together. If existence were withdrawn from a concrete substance, it would cease to exist as a concrete substance.

Thus there is a real distinction between essence and existence for St. Thomas, while for Aristotle there is no such distinction. Why? The reason is that for Aristotle there was no creation, and there was no need to explain how the world came into existence. St. Thomas, on the other hand, had to explain the Biblical doctrine of creation and

³To speak of a substance in terms of the metaphysical principles of being—form and matter—may be likened to the study of anatomy in which the static substance is studied in cross section. On the other hand, to speak of the same substance in terms of the metaphysical principles of being—potency and act—may be likened to the study of physiology in which the substance is studied as a dynamic being in the process of actualizing its potentiality. St. Thomas stresses the latter and his philosophy therefore is extremely dynamic.

he also had to explain the existence which the world received at its creation.

Let us digress for a moment and consider what the Thomists mean by the term "real distinction." There are two types of "real distinctions". The first is the real distinction between one being and another being, *e. g.*, between Peter and Paul. The second type is the real distinction between one principle of being and another principle of being, both of which

are realities which need each other to constitute a being in the full sense. They are ordered to each other transcendently, in such manner as to require a most intimate union in the order in which they are—whether it be in the order of being, of essence, of activity. Such is the union of matter and form, soul and body, act and potency, (essence and existence). The fact that either cannot be directly predicated of the whole—we cannot say that Peter is a soul—and cannot be predicated of the other, indicates that they are really distinct and that one does not contain the other actually or potentially. The fact, however, that they are predicated indirectly of the whole—Peter has a soul, Peter has a body—indicates that, although really distinct, they are parts of the whole.⁴

It has been stated that there is a real distinction between essence and existence. This is true of all created beings, since their existence is not of their essence; that is, they do not exist by their very nature. But God's existence is identical with His essence. His essence is the Act-of-Being. God is the First Cause, the First Act-of-Being from whom all creatures receive their existence. St. Thomas states:

God is directly, by Himself, the cause of very existence, and communicates existence to all things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to whatever else is illuminated by the sun. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air; similarly God must unceasingly confer existence on things if they are to persevere in existence. Thus all things are related to God as an object to its maker, and this not only so far as they begin to exist, but so far as they continue to exist. But a maker and object made must be simultaneous, just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things. Therefore God must be in all things.⁵

⁴Henri Renard, *The Philosophy of Being*, 2nd ed., Milwaukee, Bruce, 1957, p. 44.

⁵St. Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium of Theology*, C. Vollert, translator, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1955, chap. 130.

In this statement we can see the strong influence exerted on the Angelic Doctor by the Neo-Platonism of Dionysius, the Pseudo-Areopagite. This is especially evident when we look at the following passage from *De divinis Nominibus*.

Let us, then, repeat that all things in all ages derive their existence from the Pre-Existent. All Eternity and Time are from Him, and He who is Pre-Existent is the Beginning and the Cause of all Eternity and Time and of anything that hath any kind of being. All things participate in Him, nor doth He depart from anything that hath any kind of being. All things participate in Him, nor doth He depart from anything that exists; He is before all and all things have their maintenance in Him; and in short, if anything exists under any form whatever, 'tis in the Pre-Existent that it exists and is perceived and preserves its being.*

If St. Thomas or Dionysius had stopped at this point in the development of their thought, we would have been forced to conclude that they were both pantheists, but they did not stop here. For St. Thomas, God not only wills the existence of His creatures, but He wills them to exist in the way He wills them to exist, which is according to their nature.

As we have seen, the Angelic Doctor does place more emphasis on act-of-being than he does on essence. But it is the opinion of this writer that the stress is not as great as Gilson holds, yet it is considerably more than it has been thought to be until modern times. It has been pointed out that St. Thomas was influenced by the Neo-Platonism of the Pseudo-Dionysius, but it has not been pointed out that he was also greatly influenced by another Neo-Platonist, St. Augustine. With the former of these two Thomas never quarrels, either on points of philosophy or theology, and with the latter he quarrels only on points of philosophy, never on theology. It was the Neo-Platonic influence which gave the existential emphasis to St. Thomas's thought. On the other hand it was the influence of Aristotelianism, which tends to emphasize essence, which gave Thomas's thought a balance found in few other philosophies.

This brings us to a point on which we cannot agree with Gilson, who thoroughly criticizes the sources which formed the basis of St. Thomas's philosophy. These philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus,

*Dionysius the Areopagite, *The Divine Names*, C. E. Rolt, translator, London, S. P. C. K., 1920, p. 136.

Dionysius, Averroes, Avicenna and many more—were the rungs on the ladder which enabled the Angelic Doctor to reach the metaphysical heights to which he ascended. St. Thomas would have agreed with the statement: "If I have seen farther than other men, it is because I stood upon the shoulders of giants."

One such giant for St. Thomas was, as we have seen, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, whom Gilson condemns along with all the Neo-Platonic school. With this condemnation we do not agree. But neither do we agree with the opposite view as expressed by B. F. Westcott, who said: "Few even among students of theology read the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, 'out of which', to quote the enthusiastic words of their editor, 'the Angelic Doctor drew almost the whole of his theology, so that his *Summa* is but the hive in whose varied cells he duly stored the honey which he gathered from them.'"⁷ Neither of these views gives credit where credit is due.

One point which must always be kept in mind when studying St. Thomas is that his work was a synthesis⁸ of the majority of the knowledge man had accumulated up to his time. and this knowledge did not include modern physics. Also, we must remember that from the time he was six years old St. Thomas lived in a religious community, and as a result he studied and wrote with his Bible in his hand and mystic theology in his heart.

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⁷B. F. Westcott, *Essays in the History of Religious Thought in the West*, London, Macmillan, 1891, p. 144.

⁸By "synthesis" we do not wish to imply that there is no original thought in the works of the Angelic Doctor. It must be kept in mind that the thirteenth century was an age in which tradition was of the utmost importance. St. Thomas, therefore, attempted to bring together in an organized form the knowledge of those who had preceded him. And although in doing this he showed such great genius and originality that he is ranked with the greatest minds of all times, he never intended to be original.

BOOK NOTES

- Mind and Heart of Love* by Martin C. D'Arcy. New York: Meridian, 1956, (\$1.35).
Love in the Western World by Denis de Rougemont. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957, (\$1.25).
Lady Chatterley's Lover by D. H. Lawrence. New York: New American Library n.d., (\$0.50).
Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition by C. S. Lewis. London: Oxford University Press, 1958, (\$2.25).
Agape and Eros by Anders T. S. Nygren, tr. by P. S. Watson. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953, (\$7.00).

The volume entitled *Love in the Western World*, by Denis de Rougemont, is of deep and immediately relevant significance to the modern clergyman. It is at the same time an exciting and disturbing analysis of the history and contemporary nature of the concept of romantic love in our Western tradition. In a day of alarming divorce rates, reconsideration of censorship regulations following such publications as *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, the use of erotic matter in advertisements and entertainments, and numerous concerns in relation to morals, sex, love, perversion, and marriage, there is a demand for a thoughtful and disciplined analysis of our culture's assumptions in regard to these matters. A Christian minister could scarcely occupy his time more profitably than in a careful study of this whole area. Several works by unusually competent theologians including C. S. Lewis' *Allegory of Love*, Anders Nygren's *Eros and Agape*, and Fr. Martin D'Arcy's *Mind and Heart of Love* cover the ground remarkably well in their various ways but the work of de Rougemont is particularly suited to the average parish priest's need to understand and deal creatively with the concept of love in the atmosphere of twentieth century America.

de Rougemont sees in the myth of Tristan and Iseult the archetype of all subsequent Western literature of love. It is a myth in the profoundest sense of religious nature implying doctrines of man, creation, and salvation. These doctrines, however, are distinctly unchristian and partake of Gnostic-like sources from ancient Celt-iberian myth, neo-platonic mysticism, and heretical Manichaeism. Here man is viewed as essentially spirit imprisoned in the evil of flesh and creation. His salvation is completed through the ultimate frustration of "fleshly" desire effected by the platonic projection of erotic love onto an idealized lover. The soteriological episodes involve the estrangement of love

through various episodes of impossible situations for the lover's consummation and the stretching of *eros* in "exquisite anguish" and in romantic agony", finally culminating in death, or the release of the soul from the prison house of flesh.

The real demon for de Rougemont is the Manichaeism which he sees re-entering the Western tradition in the Catharistic heresy of the twelfth century. The efforts of the Roman Church, through Innocent III, St. Bernard, and the Inquisition, to exterminate this virulent heresy with crusades only drove it underground in the unconscious of the people to be revived by the myth and literature of the Troubadours of Southern France (where the Cathari were most prevalent) and by Eleanor of Aquitaine to England. The tradition thence takes on definite religious shape as the Church of "love" over against the Church of Rome. In fact there was even much significance attached to the Catharite suggestion that the Church of ROMA having inverted the essence of religion (AMOR) the non-Christian "Church of AMOR" now takes shape and exists in the myth and forms of romantic love that seduce and hurt the very children of the Christian Church—from the Troubadours to the songs, movies, and novels of contemporary society. The ancient Authurian legends took on the literary form of the Troubadours and the doctrinal heresy of the Manichaeian Cathari. The non-Christian doctrines of love are then traced in a brilliant manner through the literature of Europe and America down to present day Hollywood.

This type of romance does not really possess the quality of Christian *agape* that redeems people, reconciles those estranged, or sanctifies creation. Instead, one does not so much love one's lover as the projected image of one's own *amor*, or *eros*. When carefully analyzed an unmistakable narcissism exists in the love of love, or more accurately, in the objectifying of one's own *hubris*, or pride, in its restless search for its own fulfillment on its own terms which is indeed *death* as the Scripture tells us. However, this way is highly seductive and has indeed even penetrated "orthodox" Christianity in some of its mysticism, Mariolatry, and Puritan moralism.

As one reads this fascinating and definitive work many contemporary examples come to mind illustrating the powerful hold this heresy has on our culture. The song "Laura" ("... is the face in the train that is passing through" and "... but she's only a dream.") is more than a coincidental reminder of Petrarch's "Laura". Also, the words to "The Anniversary Waltz", "Oh, how we danced on the night we were wed,"

remind us of the characteristic quality of the tradition that love exists only during the "exquisite anguish" and "romantic agony" of the impossible situation stretching our *eros* indefinitely. Thus, marriage is almost a crime or sin to the "Church of Amor" because it would bring together two who only love their own love, and reveal its ultimate emptiness and frustration. For those caught up in this tradition "love" ends "on the night we were wed" or recurs only in a future impossible and agonizing day dream or actual illicit relationship in which the "lovers" are once again embroiled in the self-pitying agony of that same love of Tristan and Iseult, Romeo and Juliet, and modern musical comedy.

Surely the history and true character of the concept of love, analyzed and understood from Christian assumptions and redemptive alternatives, would go a long way toward the possibility of Christian love and Christian marriage. If one gets bogged down in the intricate scholarship concerning the relationship between the Cathari and the Troubadours it might be advisable to skip to the section of "The Myth in Literature" on page 173. If one becomes deeply interested it would be helpful in obtaining a balanced view to read Nygren, Lewis, and D'Arcy in the works on the subject mentioned above. All are available through St. Luke's Bookstore and all but Nygren are available in paperback editions.

C. F. ALLISON

Anglican Attitudes: A Study of Victorian Religious Controversies by A. O. J. Cockshut.
Toronto: Collins, 1959. (\$3.50).

Here is a small but lucid and important treatment of three deeply significant episodes in 19th century English Church history. The Gorham case, the squabble over *Essays and Reviews*, and the Colenso controversy are described with a deep appreciation of the profound question of authority behind them all. In each the Privy Council ultimately overruled the bishops on matters of doctrine, leaving Anglicans in a dilemma concerning a source for final historical authority.

At the same time the middle of the 19th century confronted the Anglican Church with two virulent alternatives: the Church of Rome and Agnosticism. R. I. Manning is symbolic of the flight to the former and T. H. Huxley to the latter. Cockshut shows a common need for external firm answers on the part of those who left the Church of England in either direction as a result of the issues which had so much light thrown upon them by these episodes.

An Anglican in any part of the Communion should be deeply and humbly aware of these yet unsolved difficulties that seem to represent at the same time a perplexing weakness, and more profoundly, a unique and real genius of Anglicanism.

C. F. ALLISON

HOLY COMMUNION: An Anthology of Christian Devotion compiled by Massey H. Shepherd, Jr. Greenwich: The Seabury Press, 1959, (\$3.00).

From the initial selection, taken from the *Didache*, to the final prayers from the Liturgy of the Church of South India, this Anthology adheres to its stated purpose of presenting to the reader some of the "nobler and more imperishable pieces of Christian piety from all periods and traditions of the Church's ongoing life." Selections have been made "not to prove doctrine but to improve devotion."

The book, worthwhile for this reader if for no other reason than that it includes the majestic and fascinating "Hymn of the Saviour Christ" from St. Clement of Alexandria and Alan Paton's "Meditation, for A Young Boy Confirmed," is almost certain to contain a favorite of most well-read Churchmen. Most who read from it will want to read again and in so-doing will find that it contains an abundance of materials which will indeed "improve devotion." It would not be surprising in time to find that this little book has become an Anglican classic.

Dr. Shepherd is to be thanked for sharing his inimitable knowledge of the literature of the liturgies as well as his love for it, and for suggesting in his introduction to the book ways for the average reader to gain the most benefit from it.

GEORGE M. ALEXANDER

The Liturgical Movement and the Local Church by Alfred R. Shands. London: S C M Press, Ltd., (\$2.25).

Three years ago it would not have been easy to find the author of this book on any given day, for although "based" in Cambridge he was more likely to be in Iona, Colombes, Maria Laach, anywhere he might have been led in search of some expression of that which has come to be known as "the Liturgical Movement." His interest in the Movement began, he states, with the reading of Abbé Michonneau's *Revolution in a City Parish*, which seemed "to cut through so many of the non-essentials of life in the church to the real heart of the matter—the Church's mission to Society." In the Paris experiment there was, it seemed to him, "the joyousness and the confidence of New Testament Christianity."

Since reading that remarkable book, Shands has seen the "re-discovery" of the local Church in "many corners of the world;" in France, England, Scotland, America, and in many communions. Of his experience he writes with candor and conviction, saying that in the old "usual round" of services (" 'the eight o'clock' followed by 'High Mattine' or 'High Mass', followed—by Evensong") is "so unexpressive of what life in the Church is. It is an adequate enough machine, but in the missionary situation, it is not equal to the task."

"We need a better way of life in the Church," writes Shands, "which both helps us to be better Christians and tells the pagan world something important about ourselves as in Christ." Needed is "some expression of life in the Church which says that we are essentially a community joined together in Christ—a way which will give full scope to the lay ministry—which emphasizes the importance of the home in the Church—" In attempting to show the way, his book offers "a few working sketches of what *is being done* in the Church today."

Shands suggests ways to proceed in any attempt to reap the best fruits of such an objective, from "getting the facts" of the situation, to "awakening the local church to its vocation", the structure of the "new pattern" to be developed. He writes of the need for teamwork, "liturgical strategy," and methods of operation to make the new approach to life in Christ exciting and rewarding to all who participate.

Having written well his own observations, the author offers a long bibliography to help the reader go farther and deeper into the important subject with which he deals. Readers of Herbert and Southcott, of the materials produced by the Parish Associates, will certainly want to see his book.

GEORGE M. ALEXANDER

The Temple of Jerusalem by André Parrot, tr. by B. E. Hooke. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, (\$2.75).

One of the areas of ignorance in the Biblical field is the area concerning "The Temple". Students who show a considerable knowledge of the text and the historical background of the Old Testament will often have almost a complete blank about the Temples of the Jews.

In a remarkably small compass, André Parrot has given us a great deal about the Jerusalem Temples. The latest archaeological evidence is conveniently cited and attractively presented. Not all students of the Old Testament would agree with everything that Monsieur Parrot

says, but he is fair in giving views other than his own, and balanced in his estimates. This book would be a fine addition to a parish library, or the personal library of any clergyman. DAVID B. COLLINS

A Secular Journal by Thomas Merton. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., 1959, (\$3.75).

One of the amazingly successful voices of our time has been the voice of a silent Trappist monk. Thomas Merton has written autobiography, biography, mystical theology, poetry, and journals. His most engaging success has been with his "confessions"—*The Seven Storey Mountain* and *The Sign of Jonas*. To these is now added *A Secular Journal*, covering the years 1939 until 1941, from the time shortly after he became a Roman Catholic to his becoming a monk.

Here, although at a lesser temperature than in *The Seven Storey Mountain*, we have the powerful communication, the silent man who speaks of our age, who, in his writing and speaking, speaks to our age.

Politics, literature, poetry, personal vocation—all take us effectively to the heart of our century and its longing, bring us back to those fateful years we need to remember.

In this book, as in the others Merton has written, we have shown to us (usually implicitly and without design) the real miracle of conversion—the change of focus from a tough inner, existential concern with the problems of self to an outward, loving, seeking and finding the God who hides Himself. We experience the fascination of seeing a man losing himself, denying himself, to seek God, and in finding God, finding himself.

The author ends as a monk in the very Abbey he describes in his journal as being a paradise (both material and spiritual), but only a paradise because it is also a purgatory. DAVID B. COLLINS

Religion Without Revelation by Julian Huxley. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, (\$4.00).

This is the pinnacle of the attempt of humanism to exploit all the values of religion without subscribing to the theistic hypothesis. Julian Huxley says, "the concept of evolutionary humanism has been of value to myself. . . . It has enabled me to see this strange universe into which we are born as a proper object both of awe and wondering love and of intellectual curiosity. . . . In the increased realization of possibili-

ties it has provided a common measuring rod for all kinds of directional processes, from the direction of personal ethics to large-scale evolution, and given solid ground for maintaining an affirmative attitude and faith, as against that insidious enemy, Goethe's *Geist der stets verneient*, the spirit of negation and despair. It affirms the positive significance of effort and creative activity." I recommend this book as the narthex for those seeking reconciliation for life in the Christian faith. It is a book that vigorously denies the validity of that faith, but which nevertheless affirms all its values. It is an extraordinary paradox that naturalism today is the best exponent of the values of Christianity. In an age in which many exponents of Christian piety make no sense to any intelligent person, it is the naturalist who in denying God somehow proclaims his glory.

W. O. CROSS

St. John's Gospel (A Commentary) by R. H. Lightfoot. London: Oxford University Press, 1956, (\$4.80).

This work is completely representative of British biblical scholarship today. It is devout, thorough and comprehensive. It reflects its author's extensive classical knowledge, as well as his acquaintance with the Church Fathers. It is possible that the introduction has lost something because Lightfoot did not live to publish the work himself; but no one will deny that C. F. Evans has contrived to present the substance of the author's notes with fidelity.

The person accustomed to the critical approach of American scholars will find here an entirely different atmosphere. Many questions which would receive close attention on this side of the Atlantic have been passed over with brief comment. The treatment of the text is described as "exposition" (which in this country is regarded as homiletic rather than as critical study), and this description seems more appropriate to the presentation offered than would be the term "exegesis". The text followed is the English Revised Version of 1881, with the acceptance of several marginal variants.

The average layman interested in such a study, and probably the average priest as well, may well find this book more helpful than most of what has been written on the Fourth Gospel in recent years, although it is doubtful that it can replace William Temple's *Readings in St. John's Gospel* as a devotional study. The specialist, however, and even the reader who seeks information in preference to inspiration,

will not be satisfied. Many problems remain to be solved, and it is clear that the standard critical commentary on John for the present generation has not yet been written.

J. H. W. RHYS

The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation by Bertil Gärtner, tr. by C. H. King. Uppsala: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1955, (20 kr.).

No school of New Testament study during the past twenty years has been growing in importance as rapidly as that of the Church of Sweden at Uppsala. The series of monographs published as *Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis*, of which this is the twenty-first, is indeed an impressive group of publications. Anyone who seeks an understanding of Christian thought in the first century will gain rich rewards from the research of these very sane scholars. The Uppsala Seminary has shown such confidence in the work of its specialists that it has provided for the translation of all these publications into English, French and German. This school of study is more concerned with the great issues of religious philosophy than with the narrower questions of biblical criticism.

Here one finds a careful analysis of Greek and Jewish historical writing in the period prior to the production of the Acts of the Apostles, together with an evaluation of Luke as an historian, and a review of earlier interpretations of the Areopagus Speech. There follows a careful treatment of the text of Acts 17:16-34, and a consideration of whether early Christian apologetic represents an assimilation to or an adaption of the prevailing pattern of thought in the Gentile world of the time. All of this serves to introduce the central consideration of *natural revelation*, which Gärtner with good reason regards as a more satisfactory term than *natural theology*. Particular aspects of this *natural revelation*, such as the conception of God and the Jewish polemic against idolatry and the idea of universalism in the divine plan of salvation, are appended to this. The work concludes with a discussion of the Areopagus Speech as related to the teaching of Paul.

There are certain possible criticisms of this monograph, perhaps the most serious being the relative conservatism adopted on issues of biblical criticism. One might feel more confidence in the author's interpretation of Scripture if he had given greater recognition to the arguments against the historical accuracy of this chapter of Acts. This complaint may also be made against other books in this series, for most

of the Uppsala scholars tend to accept traditional ascriptions of authorship without hesitation. Some additional attention might also be paid to the thought of those who argue against any significant adaptation of pagan terminology in the New Testament, although the present reviewer would agree with the conclusions of Gärtner and the others on that point. In summary, however, it must be said that this work takes its place with those of America's Easton and Germany's Dibelius among the most significant studies of Acts in the present century.

J. H. W. RHYB

Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls by F. F. Bruce. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956, (\$2.50).

Among the studies of the writings from Qumran which have attempted to assess their value and probable influence, this is one of the more satisfactory. The author is a scholar of high repute and judgment, and this work gives further evidence of his competence. The first half of the book adds nothing new to what others have said about the discoveries, but it is necessary information for those readers who have not previously worked through some comparable account. One cannot attempt to interpret the scrolls until one has a grasp of what they contain, and of how they were brought to the attention of archaeologists.

It is in the five latter chapters that the interpretive work is to be found. Their titles alone stir interest: Biblical interpretation and the Messianic Hope, the Teacher of Righteousness and his enemies, the Qumran Community, Qumran and the Essenes, and Qumran and Christianity. Unlike many of the earlier writers, Bruce has avoided the temptation to overemphasis upon points which appeal to him personally, and his treatment is consistently judicious. He shows the importance which the documents have for all future study, and at the same time he makes it clear that the fundamental tenets of earlier Bible study have not been destroyed. Qumran cannot be considered the cradle of Christianity, but it does reveal some of the vital forces in Judaism upon which early Christianity could have drawn.

In the epilogue the author makes it quite clear that he has not tried to say the last word on this subject. Undoubtedly many more years will pass before the last word can be said. One leaves this book with the conviction that when the final summary is composed it will be written by a scholar who shares the temper and breadth of vision seen

in Professor Bruce. The skill of the publishers has added in no small degree to the attractiveness of this volume.

J. H. W. RHYS

Choice To Love by Robert Raynolds. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959, (\$3.75).

This contemporary book about the nature of love and its necessity in the life of man is by Robert Raynolds, a leading American novelist. He turns from the novel and the drama to write about "the greatest theme in the world". This he does with profound insight and artistic skill. The book was written at the request of Mr. Raynolds' children and it is dedicated to his wife. The book encompasses beauty, joy, grief, pain and laughter in the love of family, friends, lovers, and simply fellow men.

The author attempts to answer six questions: 1. Is there a common sense of love? 2. Is there a wisdom of love? 3. What are the enemies of love? 4. Can a man choose to love? 5. How shall a man build a "small parish" of love? 6. What is the divine wonder of love?

The discussion of the enemies of love is arresting. Some of these enemies are the fear of death, the fear of being despised and rejected, dependence on magic, and doting on sex.

Some constructive suggestions include: love can take care of its enemies, love does not have to win a point, in a community of love we do not murder one another, and to love is to be responsible to God.

This book is arranged as a series of short essays which can be used for personal meditation. The material is ideal for family reading or church group discussion.

VESPER O. WARD

"Bayard Hale Jones (1887-1957): Priest, Teacher, Liturgiologist", by George M. Alexander. *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, pp. 139-164, June 1959.

It is not usual in these pages to offer notes on articles appearing in periodicals, partly because of the overwhelming quantity of such articles and partly because the journals they appear in are often not readily available to those who do not subscribe to them. This particular article, however, is one which must be noted in this particular journal. Not only is the author centrally related as dean to this institution—which is not in itself sufficient reason to make an exception; not only is the subject a man who for many years was closely associated

with this school as a teacher—though this is more nearly a sufficient reason; but he was a person whose thought and personality so deeply and lastingly affected so many of our alumni that failure to draw attention to this article would almost be a personal affront to our readers.

Dr. Alexander has written a brief review of the life and work of Dr. Jones in a manner that is too seldom seen. It is so easy to become fulsome and cloying in the attempt to speak of a man one has known and loved as one's teacher and, later, as one's colleague. Dr. Alexander has avoided this, setting the tone by a quotation, which appears on the first page of the article, from a letter by Cuthbert A. Simpson, then Professor of Old Testament at the General Theological Seminary. Dr. Simpson testified to his respect and affection for Dr. Jones by commenting on the depth of his scholarship, the tenacity with which he held his considered opinions, and the bluntness with which he expressed them. (Those who have been privileged to know both these men will notice how closely they resemble each other in these respects.) Dr. Alexander has preserved throughout his article the proper attention to all these qualities, so that the result is a true picture of the man as his friends knew him, rather than a more idealized, but correspondingly less great, figure.

This article gives those of us who did not know him long, or as well as we would have liked, an opportunity to see the over-all development of his thought on a number of topics: Catholicism and Protestantism, the priesthood, the role of the Christian scholar, as well as some of the principles which lie behind his liturgical views.

CHARLES L. WINTERS, JR.

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Frank A. Graham". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Director of Development